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Transnistrian Economy: Initiatives and Risks 
 
 
The idea of a federal state suggested by the OSCE so unexpectedly and supported both by the 
guarantor states, the Republic of Moldova, and Transnistria is gradually “seizing the masses”. 
First steps were made towards “a common state”: the composition of joint Constitution drafting 
commission was approved; workshop on federalism was held under the aegis of the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly; the development of the Reintegration Concept is underway. In order to 
speed up this process it is important to raise potential of mutual understanding and awareness. 
 
 
Searching for a way 
 
Before the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria agreed to a future “common state”, the 
economy of these subregions developed in different ways of trials and mistakes. In Moldova, 
market reforms started in 1992-1993, but now attempts are being made to strengthen presence of 
the state in the economy. In TMR, state regulation has always been a preferred method and 
market processes did not intensify until late 1990s. Generally speaking, the following stages can 
be distinguished in the economic development of Transnistria: 
 
· 1990 – 1991: search for a “free economic zone” model, attempts to implement the 
“regional self-financing” model suggested by the Baltic republics and popular during 
perestroika in the USSR. Case for it: large-scale multi-sectoral industry, intensive 
agriculture, premises for tourism development, and advantages of having transport 
routes; 
· 1992: pinnacle of tension in the relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol, military 
conflict, reciprocal attempts to block the infrastructure: power and gas supply lines, 
railroads; 
· 1993 – 1995: search for ways of economic survival without political recognition and with 
disrupted manufacturing cooperation with the right bank. The region’s managers secured 
the “resuscitation” of ties with ex FSU partners, primarily in Russia, Ukraine, and 
Belarus, and its administration reestablished ties with a number of agencies in those 
countries;  
· 1996 – first half of 2001:  Transnistrian economy is becoming “self-sustained”; 
Transnistria legalizes its foreign trade by means of Moldovan customs stamps; 
entrepreneurship develops; 
· since September 2001: foreign trade conditions deteriorate drastically – the Republic of 
Moldova introduces new customs procedures; “stamps are withdrawn”; Transnistria 
reciprocates by imposing a 20-percent tax on Moldovan goods; Russia changes its VAT 
procedures (to the country of destination principle); control at the Ukrainian border 
tightens and joint Moldo-Ukrainian customs points are set.  
 
The most recent developments have been extremely unfavorable for Transnistrian economy: its 
budget revenue declined, there were interruptions in the operation of companies (including 
Rybnitsa Metal Works which account for 2/3 of fiscal revenue), exports fell, there was shortage 
of funds for social spending. Besides, foreign debt servicing situation worsened just like in 
Moldova (foreign debt built up largely due to energy supplies from Russia).  
 
Despite all of the above, being experienced in the “struggle for survival”, Transnistrian 
leadership is taking every measure to prepare Transnistrian economy for new conditions as 
Russia’s military presence in the region is coming to an end (in late 2003 according to the OSCE 
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Porto Summit resolution). The measures include pro-market amendments to legislation, attempts 
to attract foreign investors to the region, drastically intensified privatization processes, and 
establishing contacts with the international organizations, starting with cultural and humanitarian 
ones.  
 
 
Macroeconomic Tendencies 
 
A set of Transnistria’s key macroeconomic indicators gives a general picture of trends in 
Transnistrian economy.  
Table 1 
Main Macroeconomic Indicators of Transnistria 
Indicator 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
GDP, mln US$ 327.6 447.6 331.6 281.0 199.5 255.6 250.3 
    - % against previous year … 136.6 74.1 84.7 71.0 128.1 97.9 
    - % against 1996  100.0 136.6 101.2 85.8 60.9 78.0 76.4 
    - per capita, mln US$ 478.0 663.1 492.0 423.9 304.2 394.9 392.3 
Industrial output        
    - % against previous year 89.3 99.1 93.7 96.2 116.5 109.0 81.5 
Agricultural output        
    - % against previous year 84.5 144.0 69.4 72.8 82.4 109.3 104.0 
Exports, mln US$ 305.6 387.4 39.1 258.0 328.1 377.7 243.4 
Imports, mln US$ 222.0 301.2 587.3 416.5 489.2 541.0 449.6 
Population (at year-end), thousand people 679.1 670.8 665.7 660.0 651.8 642.0 633.5 
    - of which, working-age population 400.3 396.5 391.3 396.5 390.1 391.4 … 
Monthly average nominal wage, US$ 41 53 57 68 32 44 50 
Monthly average pension, US$ 17 21 27 25 13 20 19.5 
State budget deficit as % of GDP 1.8 12.8 1.1 1.0 2.0 2.1 … 
 
Ironically, despite differences in the nature of reforms and more complicated development 
environment compared to the Republic of Moldova (lack of recognition, no credits), the 
trajectory of Transnistria’s main indicators has been very close to those of Moldova: it adapted to 
the market and reached its peak in 1997, declined in 1998 in the aftermath of Russian financial 
crisis, and then revitalized like Moldova did. Persisting latent interdependence of the two 
subregions’ economies and common focus of their exports and imports on the CIS and primarily 
Russia as their main investment and trade partner account for that.      
 
Despite the region’s commitment to state regulation methods, developments in the GDP pattern 
have generally resembled the market economy trends. 
Table 2 
GDP Pattern of Transnistria (in current prices, % of total) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Of which:       
o goods manufactured 55.8 56.2 48.3 61.5 45.0 43.0 
o services rendered 33.6 36.1 43.4 32.2 44.1 47.9 
o net taxes on imports and products 7.9 7.7 8.3 6.3 10.9 9.1 
 
Source: ? ?????? ? ??????????????? ???????????????? ?????, ? 46, ? ??? 2003 
 
Like in Moldova, service sector is the driving force. Its share in GDP has been growing steadily, 
which is consistent with the market economy trends. However, two issues are worth noting: first, 
service tariffs (especially utilities) have been growing much faster than consumer price index; 
second, the so-called non-market services, that is, those rendered by the budget (non-
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manufacturing) sector, account for approximately 40 percent of the total volume of production 
services. This means that the share of real sector in GDP has been declining.  
 
The situation in the real sector has not been easy. The upward trend in industrial production was 
recorded for the first time in 2000 (+16.5 percent) and partly continued through 2001 
(+9 percent). However, the shock of September 2001 events for industry (especially ferrous 
metallurgy) had a cumulative effect, and, as a result, in 2002 output reduced by 18.7 percent. 
Agriculture, which used to be highly profitable, has been subsidized in recent years. Despite 
increase in agricultural output (9 percent in 2001 and 4 percent in 2002), production losses 
almost doubled. For example, in 2002 the share of loss-making agrifarms went up by almost 
10 percent. Cereals (wheat, barley, corn) account for more than 2/3 of crops production. 
Production of fruits and vegetables, especially irrigated ones, reduced drastically, just like in 
Moldova. The marketability of agriculture diminished.  
 
Despite its dire circumstances, Transnistria accumulated some monetary management 
experience. Hyperinflation experienced by both Transnistria and Moldova developed into more 
moderate monthly-average price increase rates in the early 1990s: 1999 – 7.0 percent, 2000 – 
5.5 percent, 2001 – 2.0 percent, and 2002 – 0.9 percent. 
 
In addition to central bank (Transnistrian Republican Bank, TRB) regulating the monetary 
policy, the region’s banking sector comprises ten more banks, of which four are banks with 
foreign participation and one is a branch of Moldovan Moldinconbank. As of January 1, 2003, 
total gross owner equity of Transnistrian commercial banks was US$ 31.2 mln, of which foreign, 
including Russian capital, was 28.7 percent.  
 
The central bank’s “Transnistrian ruble exchange rate” policy changed over time. During the 
initial period of 1993-March 1998, according to the bank itself, the exchange rate was regularly 
revised and set at a certain level based on the market considerations. In April-August 1998, the 
exchange rate was determined by the exchange trading, however, the Russian crisis undermined 
the fragile balance. The central bank was virtually deprived of the exchange rate support 
intervention opportunities – the Transnistrian ruble depreciation was arrested artificially. This 
was the case in September-December 1998. In late 1998, it was decided to set the exchange rate 
at US$ 1=Trub 1.12 mln. As a result of major discrepancy between official and market exchange 
rates, output declined, goods exports fell, repatriated proceeds reduced, etc.  
 
In 2002, the TRB shifted from administered exchange rate to the administered floating rate – the 
TRB started setting single official exchange rate of the Transnistrian ruble based on the auction 
results within the exchange rate band set for the year consistent with the gradual devaluation 
policy. In 1999, the Transnistrian ruble devalued by a factor of 2.9; in 2000, by 47.3 percent, and 
in 2001 and 2002, by 8.8 percent and 12.7 percent respectively.1 
 
 
Foreign Trade 
 
Transnistrian economy is highly dependent on foreign trade. Transnistrian factor, in its turn, has 
major impact on both foreign and domestic trade of the Republic of Moldova (transshipment, re-
export, commodity flows of informal economy). It would be difficult to quantify the impact due 
to unreliable customs and transport statistics; however, indirect methods could be used.  
 
                                               
1 ? ?????? ? ??????????????? ???????????????? ?????, ? 46, ? ??? 2003 ?., ???. 24 
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Thus, it is noteworthy that the openness of Transnistrian economy (export/import-to-GDP ratio, 
%) is much higher than that of the Republic of Moldova (see Table 3).  
Table 3 
Openness of Moldovan and Transnistrian Economies 
(Foreign Trade as Percentage of GDP) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Transnistria 161.1 153.8 279.4 240.0 409.7 359.4 276.9 
Moldova 110.2 105.8 97.6 89.6 96.9 99.1 111.7 
Russia 30.7 32.1 40.5 53.1 42.8 38.5 0.0 
Ukraine 71.8 62.5 65.2 76.1 … … … 
 
Although the volume of Transnistrian exports and imports have not been sustainable year by 
year, there has been a steady increase in import surplus: in 1999, US$ 158.5 mln; 2000, US$ 
161.1 mln; 2001, US$ 163.3, and 2002, US$ 206.2 mln. For a number of items, imports volume 
exceeds regional needs by a wide margin. In 1996-1997, export-to-import ratio was 
approximately 130 percent; in 1999-2001, 61.9-69.8 percent; and in 2002, 54.1 percent, of which 
with the CIS, 41.2 percent. 
 
Transnistrian economy is focused on the CIS market because it accounts for 46.7 percent of 
Transnistrian exports and 61.3 percent of its imports (2002 data). At the same time, according to 
statistics, first steps were made to diversify foreign markets and reduce Transnistria’s 
dependence on the limited range of partner countries. Thus, while in 1996 Russia, Ukraine, and 
Moldova accounted for 72.7 percent of Transnistrian exports, after 1998 they made up just 33.2-
47.7 percent. Similarly, those countries’ share in Transnistrian imports went down from 
81.7 percent in 1996 to 53.5-58.1 percent over past three years. 
 
Energy resources (about 50 percent), metallurgy resources, and chemicals prevail in the pattern 
of imports from the CIS; main export items to the CIS are: machine-building, light industry 
products, furniture, and foodstuffs. Rolled steel supplied both to the CIS countries and the West 
and light industry products (Italy, Germany, etc.) dominate in the pattern of exports to other 
regions of the world.  
 
Since neighboring Ukraine is preparing to join the WTO, one of the requirements of which is 
controlled transparency of the borders, an agreement was concluded by the Moldovan and 
Ukrainian customs services, under which, effective May 25, 2003, goods will be crossing 
Ukrainian and Moldovan border, including Transnistria, based on the trade and customs 
documents used in the international practices.  
 
Transnistria and the Republic of Moldova have good prerequisites to jointly enter new foreign 
markets and strengthen their presence in the old ones. The prerequisites grew stronger as 
Moldova joined the WTO; it is time to take advantage of them.  
 
 
Moldo-Moldovan Trade 
 
As regards trade and economic relations between Transnistria and Moldova, they are far from 
being transparent. Such ties are maintained mostly in view of the interests of economic entities, 
despite and disregarding the actions taken by the policy-makers and legal provisions.  
 
Attempts of both administrations to solve political problems by means of administrative and 
economic methods, such as introduction of new customs procedures by the Republic of Moldova 
at its border and imposition of 20-percent duty on Moldovan goods by Transnistria, Transnistrian 
authorities’ decision to tighten migration controls, introduce transit fee for foreign nationals, 
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including Moldovans, transport fee (10 percent of the goods value) for motor vehicles not 
registered in the territory of Transnistria, etc., impede free movement of goods and services. A 
decision was reached to set up joint Moldo-Ukrainian customs points effective second half of 
2003.  
 
The vitality of traditional trade relations and personal contacts between the economic entities 
operating in the adjacent subregions hinges on their interests, due to which trade between the two 
banks of the Dniester River did not die out. Moldova’s share in Transnistrian foreign trade has 
been stably high: 10.5 percent in 2000; 15 percent in 2001; and 13 percent in 2002. This means 
that, as of 2002, the Moldovan market, including transit through it, has been the main one for 
Transnistrian producers: Transnistria’s total exports to the Republic of Moldova amounted to 
US$ 56.5 mln, which makes up more than 23 percent of total exports. By way of comparison, 
exports to Russia amounted to US$ 43 mln, or 17.5 percent of total exports. In the imports 
pattern, Moldova accounts for 7 percent – the same as Germany, for example.  
 
Clearly, lack of reciprocal stability in trade affected the volume of goods and services. In 2002, 
Transnistria’s total exports went down by 36 percent against 2001, of which to Moldova, by 
39 percent. Imports also fell by 17 percent, of which those from Moldova by a much wider 
margin of 31 percent. Apparently, new trade barriers impeded access to the Transnistrian, rather 
than Moldovan, market. At the estimate of the Transnistrian Ministry of Economy, the region’s 
losses from “economic blockade” amounted to US$ 174 mln, while Transnistria’s GDP was US$ 
250.3 mln in 2002.  
 
 
Changes in Legal Framework 
 
Like Moldova, Transnistria is continuously “improving its economic legislation”. Tax reform is 
one of the major recent novelties. In late 2000, the Supreme Soviet of Transnistrian Moldovan 
Republic (TMR) approved a package of tax laws: on amendments to current legislation 
(11 laws), including the Law on Tax System Fundamentals, and six new laws, including Sales 
Tax Law and Single Social Tax Law. In 2002, the tax legislation was further upgraded: new 
versions of the Corporate Income Tax Law and Excise Tax Law were approved – they both have 
been in effect since January 1, 2003.  
 
Introduction of a sales tax in Transnistria, which absorbed most of the earlier taxes, including 
VAT, was aimed to achieve two main objectives: streamline the tax system and reduce the tax 
burden.  
 
Managers’ first response to changes in the tax model was positive. However, it turned out that 
two years later 1/3 of enterprise managers named heavy tax burden as one of the most significant 
reasons impeding an increase in output.2 The fact that Transnistria’s tax system is not 
harmonized with those of its trade partners – Russia, Ukraine, Moldova (due to change in the 
VAT payment procedure in some CIS countries effective since the second half of 2001) – is the 
factor reducing the competitiveness of products in foreign markets. In fact, domestic exporters 
are taxed twice. Companies pay single sales tax, comprising profit tax, VAT, property tax, etc. in 
the republic and they have to pay the VAT in a trade partner country.  
 
It is a heavy tax burden which causes an informal economy, like in Moldova. In view of this, in 
late 2002 the Supreme Soviet of Transnistria passed a Law on Streamlined Taxation of Small 
                                               
2 ? ????????? ??????????? ?????????, ? ?????? ? ??????????????? ???????????????? ?????, ? 46 (3), ? ??? 
2003, ???. 3 
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Business and Tax Amnesty Law to define legal framework for, and principles of, tax amnesty in 
order to legalize the economic entities’ income and property located abroad. Also, anti-money 
laundering provisions were introduced. Single tax on aggregate income was introduced for small 
businesses.  
 
In order to increase the efficiency of entrepreneurship legislation, amendments to the Civil Code, 
Joint Stock Companies Act, and Foreign Investment Law were passed and new laws were 
approved on Individual Entrepreneurial Patent and Limited Liability Companies. The judicial 
system reform is underway in the interests of the economic entities, its main objective is to 
ensure the independence of judiciary.  
 
 
Privatization, at Last 
 
Pivotal progress in the ownership reform started somewhat later than in the neighboring 
countries. Ownership privatization process has been underway in Transnistria for two years now; 
however, it has been mostly small-scale privatization of service providers, construction in 
progress, housing, and state property located outside of the region. 
 
First “large-scale privatization” attempts were made in 2002 – almost a decade later than in 
Moldova. It intensified, first, because Transnistrian authorities sought the economic stability of 
large industries by attracting investor funds, primarily from Russia. Second, privatization 
proceeds are now viewed as one of the main sources of funding the republic’s budget deficit and, 
effective 2003, the TMR Economic Development Fund. Third, privatization would serve as a 
safeguard of ownership rights within a “common state”.  
 
The 2001-2002 privatization program comprised 35 companies. However, just two of them were 
privatized before the deadline expired. Due to this the program was expanded to include such 
attractive companies as Moldovan Metal Works, Transnistrian Telecom, Bouquet of Moldova 
Winery, etc. The reality of privatization has been quite mixed, however.  
 
Thus, sale of Telecom to the only buyer – local Interdnestrcom – in January 2003 for US$ 2 mln 
and channeling the proceeds to the republican budget was accompanied by the new owner’s 
commitment to modernize communication services at its own expense within five years, while 
the state retained the right to administer tariffs.  
 
In June 2002, after two-year long discussion, one of the most systemic laws, the Land Code, was 
passed. Its main concept is: land is state ownership. It can be transferred into use, possession, 
succession, or rent only to Transnistrian nationals permanently residing the republic. Thereafter, 
in April 2003, an attempt was made to hold a referendum on private land ownership. The attempt 
failed.  
 
A decision to hold land referendum has become a logical extension of the privatization of 
industries. Also, the agricultural sector’s interests were probably taken into account – it only 
survives due to state subsidies and concessional loans from Agroinvest, a subsidiary of the 
Transnistrian Republican Bank. Experiments with land rent in farming failed. There were cases 
when “farmers” rejected their land and returned it to the state because there are no adequate 
conditions for economic activities.  
 
Constitutional land referendum was deemed failed due to low activity of the population, 
primarily in urban areas (the participation rate was below 40 percent and approximately 
25 percent in Tiraspol and Bender). Question put up for referendum was about individuals’ legal 
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right to own land. It was presumed that trade in land cannot be discussed for next five years. 
Now, under the legislation, the issue of introducing private land ownership cannot be brought up 
for a year. For the time being, land plot registration procedure has been streamlined in order to 
speed up the privatization of industries.  
 
 
Appeal to Investors 
 
Transnistria, like Moldova, needs the inflow of foreign investment badly. Investment is 
necessary in order to both reconstruct the infrastructure (primarily Cuciurgan Power Plant, gas 
and water supply systems, railroad power lines) and renovate export-oriented companies.  
 
As of January 1, 2002, direct and portfolio investment in the Transnistrian economy amounted to 
US$ 54.3 mln, and the region’s outward investment, US$ 4.9 mln.3 
 
Currently, Transnistria is attracting investors by inviting them to participate in the “large-scale 
privatization”. Among others, state-owned shareholdings in Moldovan Metal Works 
(15.6 percent at the initial price of US$ 10 mln) and Moldavizolit JSC (37.6 percent at the initial 
price of US$ 9.1 mln) are put up for sale. The selling price for Bouquet of Moldova Winery is set 
at US$ 3.6 mln. Ten more companies of the region are being evaluated with the assistance of 
KPMG-Moldova.  
 
Negotiations are underway regarding the privatization of Moldavskaya GRES (hydroelectric 
power plant), a strategic facility for both Transnistria and the Republic of Moldova. For the time 
being, under a contract concluded between Union Fenosa, Spain, and Moldavskaya GRES in 
August 2001, the latter undertakes to cover approximately 70 percent of Moldova’s electricity 
needs. The contract value is US$ 267 mln. It was the presence of the foreign investor in the 
energy sector of Moldova which contributed to solving one of the crucial economic problems in 
the relations between Moldova and Transnistria. It would serve as a good benchmark for the 
future.  
 
As far as the Russian capital is concerned, it is working in the Transnistrian market already, 
mostly in the form of financial and technical loans to enterprises. Thus, Rybnitsa Metal Works, 
2/3 of the shares of which are owned by ITERA, Russia, has recently obtained a loan of 
US$ 20 mln from a Russian bank. Russia’s interest in stabilizing and “codifying” its ties with the 
region was evidenced by the inclusion of seven Transnistrian companies in the production 
cooperation program between the Republic of Moldova and Russia. It is another example of 
finding an economic solution to a political problem.4  
 
Strategic focus of such giants of Russian business as RAO Gazprom and RAO EES on the 
Balkans accounts for their interest in privatizing Moldavskaya GRES. That is why chances are 
that in the short run Russian capital will be present in Transnistria in the form of ownership and 
co-ownership, rather than just in the form of lending. Amendment of the Foreign Investment 
Law attests to the seriousness of the “host party’s” intentions. Willingness to attract investors in 
the wine and tobacco sectors led to lifting the ban on foreign companies’ operation in the sectors. 
Aroma, Russia, which is the main exporter of Bouquet of Moldova’s products to the Russian 
market, stated its intent to purchase this winery.  
 
                                               
3 ? ?????? ? ??????????????? ???????????????? ?????, ? 46, ? ??? 2003, ???. 19 
4 FLUX Information Agency, April 17, 2003 
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First “swallows” from Europe are a group of joint Transnistrian-German ventures, 50 percent in 
the authorized capital of which is owned by German partners.5 
 
Moldova has not yet formulated its official stance on the privatization underway in Transnistria, 
which has partly held Western investors back. For them, a lot will be determined by progress in 
settling the situation and developing legal and socio-economic framework of the “common 
state”.  
 
Financial Risks  
 
Like any “small open economy”, Transnistria is quite sensitive to any changes in the foreign 
markets and trade policies of its partner countries. This region has been adapting to being “self-
sustainable” and developing its know-how of running a transition economy in more complicated 
conditions than, for example, Republic of Moldova or Ukraine, for a number of reasons.  
 
Presently, one of the incentives for drastic change in the management framework and methods in 
Transnistria (just like in Moldova) is the transition period experience and shortcomings, 
primarily, difficult situation with the execution of the 2003 budget approved with a gap of almost 
US$ 17 mln, or 36 percent of the expenditure side and 6.5 percent of GDP. Such indicators are 
extremely high for Transnistria because in 2000 they were 17.6 percent and 3.2 percent and in 
2001, 23.3 percent and 3.3 percent respectively. Like Moldovan budget, Transnistrian one is 
notoriously “socially-oriented” – wages of the budget sector employees, pensions, and social 
payments to the public make up more than 50 percent of its expenditure. Spending on 
maintaining public order, judiciary, national defense, and general public services made up 31.2 
percent of budgetary expenditure in Transnistria.  
 
Like in previous years, Transnistrian 2003 budget does not provide for foreign debt servicing 
(and this brings up questions). Meanwhile, as of beginning of 2003 the region’s foreign debt 
amounted to US$ 1,176.7 mln, which represents a build-up by 10 percent over 2002.6 
Obligations to pay for imported Russian natural gas account for more than 2/3 of foreign debt. 
However, according to RAO Gazprom, in 2001 and 2002 Transnistria paid for the natural gas at 
41 percent and 45 percent respectively. Chances are now the debt will be repaid by the shares of 
Transnistrian companies. Russia is interested in 14 of them: Moldavskaya GRES, Tirotex, Kvint, 
and a few machine-building facilities.  
 
Now that the idea of federalizing a “common state” has been voiced, the economic risks of 
Transnistria, in particular, its foreign debt, are within the field of vision of the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which have only dealt with Moldova’s foreign debt to date. 
In its most recent documents (Athens, April 2003), the European Union, when formulating its 
policy towards the neighboring countries, including Moldova, following its eastward expansion, 
has been paying increasing attention to the economic aspects of the “Transnistria issue”. 
 
The Republic of Moldova, on its part, also takes the lead in trying to make the most of its 
presidency at the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe (May – October 2003) to 
accelerate the reintegration process. The EU has already stated its willingness to fund the 
Transnistria Reconstruction Fund, which will be channeled to coordinate the financial, 
economic, and social systems of Moldova and Transnistria. Both parties have already given their 
tentative consent. 
Anatoly Gudym, Vladislav Kutyrkin, Galina Shelari  
                                               
5 Olvia-Press Information Agency, February 3, 2003 
6 ? ?????? ? ??????????????? ???????????????? ?????, ?? 46, ? ??? 2003, ???. 19.  
  
9 
 
PMR RM PMR RM PMR RM
Real GDP growth rate -20.9% 2.1% 11.0% 6.1% -2.7% 7.2%
Nominal GDP, USD million 199.5 1288.0 255.6 1481.0 250.3 1624.0
GDP per capita, USD 304.2 354.0 394.9 407.0 392.3 448.0
Exports of goods (fob), USD million 328.1 471.5 377.7 570.2 243.4 710.6
    Export, yr/yr 127.2% 101.7% 115.1% 120.9% 64.4% 124.6%
Imports of goods (cif), USD million 489.2 776.4 541.0 897.2 449.6 1103.1
    Import, yr/yr 117.5% 132.4% 110.6% 115.6% 83.1% 123.0%
Trade balance, USD million -161.1 -305.0 -163.3 -327.0 -206.2 -392.5
    as % of GDP 80.8% 23.7% 63.9% 22.1% 82.4% 24.2%
Current Account, USD million -133.8 -104.9 -98.0 -91.8 … -77.0
Trade balance, USD million -133.8 -293.6 -109.4 -313.5 … -354.8
Balance of services, USD million 0.2 -36.9 1.7 -47.4 … -45.9
Income balance, USD million -3.4 67.1 -4.8 111.2 … 148.9
Transfers (net), USD million 3.1 158.5 14.5 157.8 … 174.8
Capital and Financial Account, USD million 130.9 123.1 158.3 76.3 … 56.9
Direct and portfolio investments (net), USD million 0.8 235.4 -1.6 134.4 … 76.9
Other investment (net), USD million 131.4 -69.2 156.3 -46.6 … 7.9
Total external debt (incl. private and energy),  USD million 862.4 1546.5 1003.0 1504.1 1176.7 1636.8
    as % of GDP 432.3% 120.1% 392.4% 101.6% 470.1% 100.8%
Consolidated state budget balance, USD million -4.0 -13.4 -5.5 -0.1 … -8.1
Consolidated state budget balance as % of GDP 2.0% 1.0% 2.1% 0.01% … 0.5%
Cash in circulation M0, (million rub. & million lei) 26.8 1469.0 43.7 1834.0 78.1 2289.0
Broad money M3, (million rub & million lei) 159.4 3509.6 323.2 4787.4 446.0 6511.5
Monetization of the economy 17.4% 21.9% 22.1% 25.1% 28.1% 29.5%
Annual inflation rate (end period) 90.1% 18.4% 26.8% 6.3% 10.6% 4.4%
Average annual inflation rate 112.5% 31.2% 48.9% 9.7% 14.1% 5.2%
End-year exchange rate, (rub/1USD &  lei/1USD) 5.40 12.38 5.90 13.09 6.65 13.82
Average exchange rate, (rub/1USD &  lei/1USD) 4.6 12.4 5.7 12.9 6.3 13.6
2000 2001 2002
 
